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Summary findings
World Development Report 1997: The State in a  Cross-sector comparisons reveal four generations of
Changing World argued that institutions - the rules of  support for service delivery.
the game that govern production  and exchange - shape  - First-generation support focused mainly on physical
a country's prospects for sustained market-led growth.  implementation of projects.
Girishankar provides an institutional framework for  - Second-generation interventions, which
service delivery, an essential component  of state  characterized most social service interventions, focused
capability. He applies this framework to an evaluation of  on improving the financial and organizational viability of
Bank support  for service delivery in the health, nutrition,  implementing agencies through technical assistance.
and population sector.  * Third-generation  support was marked by significant
He argues for greater institutional pluralism in the  unbundling of service delivery activities and clearer links
ways the World Bank does business in infrastructure,  to goods characteristics. In irrigation  (1982-94),
rural, and social sectors, but cautions against making  telecommunications (1980s-present),  and transport
efficient service delivery an issue of "state versus  (1990s), the one-size-fits-all monopoly model gave way
market."  to a range of options based on greater private sector and
The Bank and its clients face the challenge of fitting  citizen participation in delivery. These included leases,
menus of "better practice" delivery options to maps of  concessions, outsourcing, contracting, build, operate, and
institutional reality.  In the health, nutrition,  and  transfer, and turnover schemes.
population sector, the Bank should (1) unbundle and  *  Fourth-generation  interventions are works-in-
categorize essential health and clinical services according  progress and represent efforts to develop new
to goods characteristics and (2) integrate country  governance arrangements that systematically combine
knowledge into operations through  upstream assessments  competition, voice, and hierarchy in the design, delivery,
of state, political, and social institutions.  and monitoring of Bank projects.
Overall, the Bank has made progress toward a "goods  The Bank has a poor track record building country
characteristics" approach, particularly in infrastructure  knowledge of institutional endowments that affect
and some rural services  - but it has lagged in the social  service delivery. Girishankar identifies concepts and tools
sectors, where support remains largely technocratic.  valuable for sector specialists' operations.
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1.  Introduction
1.1  With the publication  of the World  Development  Report 1997:  The State in a Changing
World,  the Bank gave voice  to a growing  body  of research  on the institutional  determinants  of
economic  performance. It argued  that institutions  -- the rules of the game that govern  production
and exchange  -- significantly  shape a country's  prospects  for sustained  market-led  growth.
Moreover,  in any economy,  the state plays a major  role in establishing  these rules. It also enjoys
monopoly  power over the legitimate  use of coercion  to enforce  them.' As a result,  the
institutional  capability  of the state  has taken on greater  significance  with far-reaching
implications  for development  policy and public  sector  reform (PSR).
1.2  This paper  provides  an institutional  framework  for service  delivery  (SD) -- an essential
component  of institutional  capability. By way of example,  it applies  this framework  to evaluate
Bank support  for SD in the Health,  Nutrition,  and Population  (HNP) sector. In so doing,  the
paper argues for a greater degree  of "institutional  pluralism"  in the ways  the Bank does  business
in infrastructure  as well as the rural and social sectors. By the same  token,  it cautions  against
conflating  the question  of efficient  service  delivery  to one of "state versus  market."
Why Service  Delivery  Institutions  Matter
1.3  The  reform of service  delivery  institutions  (SDIs)  is central  to any country  assistance
strategy (CAS)  that aims  to enhance  the state's ability  to "secure  the economic  and social
fundamentals"  of sustained  growth. The quality  of a country's SDIs  is a measure  of its ability  to
ensure  the provision  of goods  and services  with positive  externalities.  The provision  of these
services  typically  creates conditions  that are favorable  to market-led  growth  (e.g., education,
healthcare,  infrastructure,  irrigation). Furthermore,  SD is a key locus for the evolution  of the
state's relationship  to its citizenry. 2 The  very legitimacy  of the state depends  on how  well SDIs
meet the demands  of citizens.
Global  Guideposts  for Service  Delivery
1.4  In providing  good practice  advice  to its clients,  the Bank can  hardly ignore  global  trends
in SD innovation  and reform over the past two decades. Since  the late 1  970s, governments
around  the world,  particularly  in the OECD,  have embarked  on broad experiments  including  the
use of market mechanisms  and citizen  participation  in the delivery  of basic services. 3 Rapid
economic,  technological,  and political  change  has compelled  governments  to depart from the
public sector  monopoly  model  of service  provision.
1.5  Citizens,  particularly  in the United  States,  grew frustrated  with what they  perceived  to be
the state's inability  to efficiently  meet their demands  or effectively  address  entrenched  social
problems. 4 In response  to taxpayer  revolts and increased  fiscal stringency,  some public sector
managers  and policy leaders  actively  solicited  the private sector and civil society  as agents  of
I Eggertson,  1990.
2 Paul,  1998.
3 OECD, 1995.
4 Nye et al., 1997.2
service  provision  and arbiters  of the public interest.  At the same  time, rapid technologgical  change,
and widespread  pressure for political  and administrative  decentralization  brought  forth a sea
change  in the organization  of work across  the private,  public, and non-profit  sectors. 5
"Networked  organizations"  provided  greater  opportunities  to forge public-private  partnerships.
The proliferation  of information  technology  further  enhanced  the accuracy  and timeliness  of
performance  monitoring  as governments  increasingly  became  purchasers  rather than purveyors  of
public goods  and services. 6
1.6  The benefits of these SD reforms  are both varied and well-documented. They afford a
greater degree  of customization  for basic services  in order to meet citizen  demand. Furthermore,
new institutional  arrangements  such as competition  and voice place palpable  pressures  on
providers  to efficiently  meet common  content  and performance  standards  for service  provision.
In comparison,  the public  monopoly  model for SD has proven inadequate  and unsustainable.
Primarily,  it has failed  to provide  the incentives  necessary  for public employees  to meet client
demands  and perform  efficiently. Even  access  to basic human  services  -- one of the major
arguments  for public  provision  -- has often  fallen short of minimum  consumption  standards  under
many  public monopoly  regimes.
Implications  for the World  Bank and Client  Countries
1.7  Much of the Bank's assistance  in the past fifty  years has been directly  concerned  with SD
in infrastructure  as well as the rural and social sectors. Its infrastructure  portfolio  has included a
broad range of urban and rural services  such as electric  power,  oil and natural gas, urban
transport,  rural roads, water  supply  and sanitation,  as well as irrigation  and drainage. In the
social sectors,  the Bank supports  SDIs  in HNP, education,  labor  market development,  and social
safety  net development. In that sense,  assistance  to SDIs  represents  a dominant  portion  of overall
Bank lending. During  the FYI 991-1997  period alone,  infrastructure  and urban development
accounted  for 26% of IDA and IBRD  commitments  overall. Human development,  which
includes  key sectors such as education  and health,  received  17% of overall  commitments  during
the same period.
1.8  The experience  of numerous  operational  staff, evaluations  by OED  and QAG, and other
internal  reviews suggest  that Bank support  for SD has undergone  important  developments  over
the past four decades.  For instance,  alternative  institutional  arrangements  such as concessions,
leases,  and outsourcing  have increasingly  been used in infrastructure  projects. Yet, most experts
would  also acknowledge  that much  of the Bank's support  for SD, particularly  in the social
sectors,  is still narrowly  technocratic  (see Table 1). This technocratic  approach  emphasizes  the
transfer  of technology  and equipment  to developing  countries  and implicitly  assumes  that
monopolistic  public agencies  will efficiently  transfer  both resources  and know-how. Alternative
institutional  arrangements  such as civic participation,  competition,  and competition  surrogates  in
the design,  delivery, and monitoring  of Bank projects  are largely  ignored. 7 As a result,
deadweight  losses in the market for certain  goods  and services  persist and the full potential  of the
Bank's development  impact  is not realized.
5 Marshall and Tucker, 1992.
6 Steering Committee for the Review of Conmmonwealth,  1997.
7 Israel, 1987.3
Table 1.  Two Stylized Paradigms of Development Assistance for Service Delivery
Technocratic Approach  Institutional Approach
*  Focus  largely  on physical  completion  of  *  Emphasis  on sustainability  of reforms  at the
projects  sectoral  level
*  Public monopoly  model  regardless  of the  *  Diverse  delivery  systems  fitted  to demand  and
nature  of services  supply  characteristics  of services
*  Bundled  services  *  Unbundled  services  to apply appropriate
incentives  to distinct  activities
*  Exclusive  reliance on hierarchical  management  *  Use of monetary/non-monetary  and
by rules  intemal/extemal  checks  & balances  (voice  and
choice)  to provide  incentives  for performance
*  Government  agency  as the only interlocutor  *  Multiple  interlocutors,  multiple  stakeholders
Source:  Author
1.9  In contrast, an "institutional approach" to SD support would apply the knowledge of SD
reforms  in the  OECD  -- particularly,  the appropriate  use  of exit, voice,  and  hierarchy  options  -- to
developing and transition country contexts. It would shift the Bank's focus from organizations to
the underlying rules or checks and balances that provide incentives  for  efficient delivery of
services.  It would also speak to "ground realities" by explicitly incorporating the role of politics
and national institutional endowments in the Bank's strategy for SD intervention.
1.10  Clearly, there are major policy implications of this view of Bank support in SD sectors.
Therefore, any program to reshape assistance strategies in SD sectors must be based on a
systematic review of Bank support, with specific focus on the extent to which the institutional
approach has been employed in infrastructure as well as rural and social services.
Organization of the Paper
1.11  In section 2, the paper first develops an institutional framework for Bank-supported SD
reforms.  Section 3 uses the institutional framework to review Bank support for SDIs in HNP.
Section 4 concludes by applying generalizable lessons from the HNP evaluation to other sectors
that have received Bank support.  It also recommends "next steps" for strengthening Bank
support in this key area of PSR.
2.  An Institutional  Framework  for Service Delivery
2.1  Much of the academic and policy literature on SD as well as the Bank's  own experience
point to  two core ideas.  First, the institutional arrangements governing the design, delivery, and
regulation of a service should be based on its inherent goods characteristics.  The three key
variables that comprise goods characteristics are measurability, information asymmetry, and4
contestability.  s  Second,  a government's  ability  to increase  the efficiency  and effectiveness  of
SD is a function  of the "fit" between  good  practice  institutional  options  (derived  from goods
characteristics)  and country  characteristics  (see Figure 1). Typically,  country  characteristics
are comprised  of political,  state, and social  institutions  (i.e., its institutional  endowment),  which
shape inter  alia political readiness  to reform. 9
Figure 1. Fundamentals  of Service  Delivery  Interventions
Desirable  Intervention  Sustainable  Feasible  Intervention




. Poor  Knowledge  of Goods  Characteristics
Poor  "Fit"  to Country  Characteristics
Source: Author
2.2  Achieving  good fit between  goods  and country  characteristics  is an enduring  challenge
for Bank sector specialists  and country  teams. Cases  where  the Bank  has little knowledge  of
either goods characteristics  or country  characteristics  are probably  very rare (Region  1 in Figure
1). On the other hand, there are cases in which borrowing  governments  may  be knowledgeable
about local conditions  and are ready  to implement  reforms. Although  such SD interventions  are
feasible, the Bank is unable  to provide SD advice  based on goods  and design characteristics
(Region  2). In most cases, interventions  are desirable  (i.e.,  SD reform  would  enhance sectoral
performance)  but not feasible  (Region  3) because  the Bank lacks knowledge  of institutional
characteristics  that influence  a country's  political  readiness  to reform. 10 Sustainable interventions
(Region  4) are those that are both feasible  and desirable  because the Bank has successfully
operationalized  knowledge  of both goods  and country  characteristics.
8 Traditionally,  the public economics  approach  categorizes  services  by their  consumption  characteristics,  namely
rivalry and excludability.  Of three classes of goods (public, private, mixed), public goods engender significant
externalities in their provision.  This form of market failure justifies collective action through public sector provision.
While this approach does provide sound rationale for state intervention, it does not explain the myriad hybrid
arrangements (private-public) that  have emerged to enhance operational efficiency (Preker and Harding, 1998).  As
this paper demonstrates, categorizing by production characteristics (measurability, information asymmetry, and
contestability)  helps identify  optimal  combinations  of choice,  voice,  and hierarchy  needed  for  efficient  provision.
9 Levy  and Spiller, 1996;  Haggard  and McCubbins,  1997.
10  The  feasibility-desirability-sustainability  lexicon  was  adapted  from  the Bank's 1995  Policy  Research  Report,
Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership.5
Goods  Characteristics
2.3  Over the past decade,  a growing  number  of experts  and practitioners  has applied
neoinstitutional  analysis  of goods  or services  to identify  Pareto optimal  institutional  arrangements
that govern  the ownership,  funding,  delivery,  and regulation  functions  of service  provision
(Israel, 1987;  WDR 1994;  Pradhan,  1996;  Picciotto,  1996;  WDR 1997). According  to this
approach,  policymakers  choose  between  combinations  of participation,  competition,  and
hierarchy  after careful  analysis  of their respective  costs and benefits in a given  institutional
context.
2.4  Prior to addressing  delivery  options,  policymakers  typically  face questions  regarding  the
ownership  and legal status of SD agencies  and funding  of SD activities. Furthermore,
government  ownership  also lends itself to the issue of the appropriate  degree of
decentralization." While both concerns  are important,  changing  the level of government  (central
or local) or changing  the ownership  status  of service delivery  agencies  (legally  dependent,  semi-
autonomous,  or autonomous)  does not necessarily  affect the underlying  determinants  of
efficiency  and effectiveness.  Policymakers  still have to identify  mechanisms  for affecting  the
underlying checks and balances that govern SD.
2.5  Goods characteristics  help identify  checks  and balances  or institutional  arrangements
which provide  optimal  incentives  for efficient  design, delivery,  and monitoring  of services. The
three economic  variables  that determine  goods  characteristics  and shape delivery  decisions  are
measurability, information asymmetry, and contestability.
*  Measurability  is the precision with which policymakers can specify and observe the
provision  of a given SD output. Accordingly,  the effects of good or bad delivery
performance  in the provision  of high measurability  outputs  are more easily  monitored,
reported  and audited, even  by hierarchs  in the public sector.  12
*  Information Asymmetry is defined here as the degree to which information about SD
performance  is available  to users or beneficiaries,  but not principals  within  the public sector.
By this definition,  the infonnation  asymmetric  quality  of a service  is at issue when the
11 Manning, 1998.  Pradhan  (1996)  provides a way of basing decentralization  decisions on the demand  and supply
characteristics  of goods  and services.
Table 2. Degree  of Decentralization  for Service  Delivery
Degree of Decentralization  Demand-side  Factors  Supply-side  Factors
High  (Local)  *  Taste  variation  *  Potential  for  jurisdictional
*  Common  property  competition
Low (Central)  *  Spatial  consumption  externalities  *  Economies  of Scale
*  Equity  Concerns  *  Cross-jurisdictional  externalities
Source:  Pradhan,  1996
Whether authority  is retained,  devolved,  legally  dependent  or independent,  government  faces the problem of
funding  various SD activities. In such  cases,  the decision  to fund producers  or consumers  should  also  be based
on demand  and supply  characteristics.  Accordingly,  government  funds consumers  when  there are either  demand
externalities  or access/equity  considerations. Governments  fund providers  of certain goods or services  which
suffer  from free-rider  problems  in their supply  such as traditional  public  goods.
12 Measurability  is used in the same  way  that Israel  (1987)  uses specificity.6
performance  of low measurability  goods  can be more effectively  monitored  by beneficiaries
rather than public sector  hierarchs. Therefore,  information  asymmetric  goods  benefit from
voice mechanisms  to adequately  signal  provision  performance.  13
*  Contestability  is a measure  of the potential  and actual  competition  from other suppliers  for
the business  of the purchaser. The competitive  nature of the market in which services  are
being purchased  depends  on barriers  to entry and exit to producers. This includes  the level of
"specific capital"  or the costs  to other  providers  of entering  the market for the production  of
that output. For low contestability  goods,  the high level of specific  capital  raises the costs to
the purchaser  of switching  from one supplier  to another. For such goods,  there is also an
incentive  for purchaser  and supplier  to negotiate  the terms  of transactions  over the life of the
contract.  14  Conversely,  swtiching  providers  is easier  for high contestability  services,  which
are best provided  through  competitive  or market  pressures.
Table  3. Six Categories  of Goods  and  Services  with  Examples
Variables  High  Contestability  Low Contestability
High  Type  I  Type  II
Measurability  *  Publishing  *  Processing  tax returns
*  Public  transport  *  Operation  of ports  and railroads
Low  Non-info  Info  Asymmetric  Non-info  Asymmetric  Info  Asymmetric
Measurability  Asymmetric  Type  III-B  Type  IV-A  Type  IV-B
Type III-A  *  Primary  *  Budgeting  *  Watershed
*  Public  legal  education  *  Defense  management
representation  *  Irrigation  projects  for natural
*  Policy  advice  *  Police  conservation
s  Clinical  health  *  Livestock  projects
dependent  on
common  pastures
Source:  Adapted  from  Laking,  1995;  Picciotto  and Grover,  1996
2.6  Using these  three goods  characteristics,  Table 3 provides  a matrix to help categorize
services  in six different  ways along  a continuum  from high contestability-high  measurability
services  (Type  I) to the low contestability-low  measurability-information  asymmetric  services
(Type  IV-B). Examples  are also provided  for each category  of good or service.
2.7  Design,  Delivery,  Monitoring  and Enforcement:  Following  Hirschman  (1970),  the WDR
1997  identified  three broad sets of institutional  arrangements  -- exit, voice, and loyalty --  that
provide  incentives  for efficient  service  provision." 5 Goods  characteristics  indicate  appropriate
combinations  of exit (market  mechanisms),  voice (participation),  and hierarchy  (public sector
management)  for different  categories  of services. For instance,  garbage  collection  is a high
contestability-high  measurability  good (Type  I), which  indicates  that market competition  would
13 There  is significant  empirical  evidence  that beneficiary  participation  improves  the effectiveness  of certain  types of
Bank  projects  (Narayan,  1995). However,  researchers  are still searching  for an adequate  economic  criterion  for using
participation  in the project  cycle. See Picciotto,  1995;  Pritchett,  1996.
14 WDR 1997;  Hirschman,  1970; Picciotto,  1996.7
be the appropriate  check and balance  for its provision. As Table 4 illustrates,  operational  staff
will have to choose between  institutional  options  (market,  participation,  and hierarchy)  in
different stages of the Bank's project cycle, namely design,  delivery,  and regulation  (or
monitoring  and enforcement).
2.8  SD interventions  may  use various  combinations  of competition,  participation,  and
hierarchy  at different  stages of the project  cycle. For instance,  a ports project  may require a
hierarchical  design process  to define  precise  technical  and performance  requirements  of the
projects. Delivery of project goods,  i.e., the operation  of ports, could  be subject  to a competitive
bidding  arrangement,  in which private firms compete  for the market. The firm that provides  the
highest  quality service  at the lowest price is awarded  a fixed-term  contract  (e.g., in the form of a
lease or concession)  to operate  the port. Since  the performance  of the firm is relatively  easily
monitored,  the project would entrust  this function  to administrators  within  the hierarchical  public
sector  agency  awarding  the lease  or concession  (see Type  II good  in Table  4).
Table  4. Mapping  Institutional  Options  at Different  Stages  of a Bank  Project
Institutional  Options
Stage  of Intervention  Market  Participation  Hierarchy
Design  IVB  IVA
Delivery  I  IV  IA
Monitoring  &  IVB  H  IVA
Enforcement
Source:  Author  (based on discussions  with  B. Levy)
2.9  Table 4 maps out a few examples  of institutional  options for services  across  the three
stages of the Bank project cycle. The easiest SD interventions  are those which support  the
provision  of high measurability-high  contestability  (Type  I) outputs such as publishing. These
goods  undergo  competition  in the market  and so design  and monitoring  considerations  are
inherent  in market provision. A high measurability-low  contestability  (Type  II) good such as the
operation  of ports and railroads  can  undergo  private delivery  under lease or contractual  terms
because only one provider  can  provide  the service  at any time. As a result,  public sector
principals  have to define the terms  of the contract  and monitor  the performance  of the provider.
2.10  Alternatively,  information  asymmetric,  low contestability-low  measurability  (Type IV-B)
goods such as common  pool resources  require  pure participation  or management  by self-
governing  communities  during  the design, provision,  and monitoring  stages. For instance,
livestock  projects  dependent  on common  pastures are project goods  or services  for which neither
private ownership  rights (a prerequisite  for competition)  nor specifiable  outputs (a prerequisite
for effective  auditing  and reporting  functions)  exist. It is worth  noting  that Type  IV-B services
with more clearly  defined  property  rights (e.g., irrigation  with well-organized  water  users
associations)  could also undergo  co-production  -- a collaborative  arrangement  between8
beneficiaries  and state actors  -- in the design,  delivery,  and monitoring.  16  Finally,  non-
information  asymmetric,  low contestability,  low  measurability  (Type  IV-A) goods  such as
defense  are functions  which require  traditional  hierarchical,  rules-based  design, delivery,  and
monitoring.
2.11  As illustrated  above,  there are actually  a great variety of institutional  options  available  to
Bank operational  staff and their clients on SD projects.  The adoption  of these better practice
options  would have been Pareto  improvements,  which the Bank failed to secure  by relying
largely on public monopoly  arrangements  in infrastructure,  social,  and rural services.' 7 This
notion  has potentially  far-reaching  implications  for the evaluation  of development  assistance  to
SD sectors as well. Bank staff in OED and QAG,  who take an institutional  approach  to
evaluation,  will have to more deliberately  consider  whether  SD interventions  change  the rules of
the game by including  new providers  and new institutional  arrangements  (i.e.,  competition  or
voice)  to enhance  efficiency  and effectiveness  of service  provision.
Table 5.  Institutional Arrangements for Different Categories of Goods and Services
Variables  High  Contestability  Low  Contestability
High  Type  I  Type  II
Measurability  *  Competition  in the Market  with Arms-length  *  Competition  for the Market  with Arms-
Contracting  length  Contracting
*  Audit  and Report  Outputs
Low  Non-info  Asymmetric  Info  Asymmetric  Non-info  Asymmetric  Info  Asymmetric
Measurability  Type  III-A  Type  III-B  Type  IV-A  Type  IV-B
*  Hierarchical  *  Voice-based  *  Rules-based  *  Co-production
Standardization  or  Standardization  Hierarchy
Professionalization  *  Stakeholder *  Community-  *  Esprit  de Corps  Feedback
*  Audit/Report  based  planning
Inputs  & Outputs  and management
*  Audit/Report
Inputs  & Outputs
Source:  Author  with  adaptations  from Pradhan,  1996
2.12  Table 5 generalizes  the implications  of mapping  various  institutional  options  by
providing  a comprehensive  description  of these  options for each of the six categories  of goods
and services." 8 These constitute  a standard  for SDIs given  the goods characteristics  of services.
However, the ability of Bank operational staff and their clients to actually meet the goods
characteristics  standard  on an infrastructure  or social  sector  project is subject  to country
characteristics.
16 Ostrom,  1990.
17 Stevens,  1993.
18  Table  5, with the inclusion  of information-asymnnetric  goods and services,  further  develops  specificity-
contestability  matrix  used by the WDR 1997.9
Country  Characteristics
2.13  A country's  institutional characteristics determine the extent to which optimal
institutional arrangements for design, delivery, and regulation can be used in Bank projects.  The
failure to fit goods characteristics to country characteristics may result in any number of
problems on SD projects such as poor sustainability, lack of government ownership, and even
inability to meet sectoral demand for services. Three sets of institutions in client countries --
those governing the state, politics, and society -- are relevant to choosing country-specific SD
reforms, which are also politically desirable for borrowing governments (see Box 1).  Upstream
assessment of political, social, and state institutions will likely enhance the relevance and
effectiveness of country and sector strategies.
2.14  The Bank already uses some institutional assessment (IA) tools on sectoral operations.
However, further progress is needed to adequately cover all three elements of country
characteristics and standardize assessment across sectors.  Currently, IA is a work in progress as
described below and depicted in Figure 2.
Box 1. Elements  of a Country's  Institutional  Endowment  Affecting  Service  Delivery
Political  Institutions
*  Legislative  and executive  institutions
*  Character  of contending  social  interests  including  the role of ideology
State  Institutions
*  Informal  and  patrimonial  relationships  affecting  the civil service
*  Formal  accountability  institutions  within  the core  public  sector (i.e.,  intra-public  sector  regulation)
Social  Institutions  (as they relate  to  specifc SD sectors)
*  Customn,  informal,  well-accepted  norms  that  restrain  individual  and collective  action
*  Business,  NGO,  labor  organizations,  and civic associations
*  Private finms
Sources:  Adapted  from Levy  and Spiller,  1996;  Pinto, 1994
2.15  Social  Institutions:  Social  assessments  (SAs)  are currently  used on a variety  of
infrastructure, rural, and social sector projects.  Increasingly, they are being applied upstream to
country assistance strategies (CASs) with major implications for policy and institutional
choices.'9 They are also having demonstrable influence on project design by identifying
informal norms, customs, and patterns of association as well as exclusion within specific sectors.
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that participatory SAs and PAs influence the
willingness of task managers and country teams to use participatory methods in later phases of
the project cycle. 20  Ultimately, more systematic and rigorous analysis of social capital
accumulation and patterns of association will enhance the value of these types of lAs.2'
19 Social  Inclusion  and Poverty  Reduction:  A Technical  Consultation  on Albania  and Armenia,  1998.
20 Social  Development  Family  and Learning  and Leadership  Center,  1998.  Also  discussions  with Janis  Bernstein
(MNSED)  and Joanna  Godinho  (ECSHD)  on the Uzbekistan  Rural  Water  Supply and Sanitation  Project.
21 Narayan  and Pritchett, 1997.10
2.16  Political Institutions:  Bank  reviews of SD projects  have historically  cited "political  will"
or "lack of government  commitment"  as a major determinant  of whether  policy reforms  are
actually  adopted. Yet, country  teams have  acknowledged  the need for more  rigorous  analysis  of
how  political institutions  influence  the strategy  and sequencing  of policy  reforms, governance
within a sector,  and stakeholders'  credible commitment  to new rules for SD.  22 In the last decade,
advances  in the study of political  institutions  have  enabled  the development  of user-friendly
political readiness  analyses  (PRAs). Haggarty  and Matsuda  have developed  a PRA tool for task
managers that draws on the political desirability,feasibility,  and sustainability concepts first
introduced  in Bureaucrats in Business (1995). 23
Figure  2. Assessing  Elements  of Country  Institutional  Endowment
FePliialDsiabilit  y  A  alysis
/  t  Social  Assessments  }  Assessment  of
Poverty  Assessments  Accountability
/overty Assessments  Institutions  in tie Core
Society  State
Source:  Author
2.17  Accordingly,  SD reforms  are characterized  in three ways:
*  A reform  is politically  desirable,  but not feasible,  when  a Bank intervention  potentially
enhances  sectoral  performance,  yet is not aligned  with either the political  preferences  or
political incentives  of key stakeholders  (e.g., a sitting  government,  organization  opposition,
interest  groups,  etc.)
*  A reform is politically  feasible,  but not desirable,  when the  political preferences  of
stakeholders  favor reforms,  yet Bank  interventions  fail to provide  a menu of good  practice
SD options.
*  A reform is sustainable  when  efficiency-enhancing  interventions  align with political
preferences  and incentives  of key stakeholders.  As a result,  stakeholders  are able to provide
22 Levy and Spiller, 1996.
23 Haggarty and Matsuda, 1998; Haggard and McCubbins, 1997.11
credible  commitments  to SD regimes  and the government  is able to overcome  the formation
of coalitions around reversionary policies (i.e., policies that reverse SD reforms).
2.18  After successful  piloting,  the Haggarty  tool will enable  operational  staff to systematically
classify  SD interventions  as politically  desirable,  feasible  or sustainable. Ultimately,  it will also
allow the Bank to identify  political  institutions  that hamper  a borrowing  government's  readiness
to reform.,
2.19  While the Haggarty  tool is particularly  well-suited  for analysis  of systemic  reforms,
Berryman  et al. have developed  a tool that focuses  on assessing  institutional  capability  and
political readiness  of micro-level  stakeholders  during  implementation.  It attempts  to identify
relevant  players,  rules and incentives  (in politics, administration,  and civil society)  that affect
implementation  and therefore,  the likelihood  of achieving  desired  project  outcomes. 24 Like the
Haggarty  tool, this micro-level  assessment  tool is ready for pilot-testing.
2.20  State Institutions:  Historically,  the Bank has been slow  in developing  tools for assessing
state or core public sector  institutions  and their likely  influence  on policymaking  and service
delivery  outcomes. A notable exception  was Pinto's work  (1994)  on Institutional  Environmental
Assessments  (IEAs),  which attempted  a governance  approach  to sectoral adjustment  projects  that
relied on upstream  diagnoses  of formal  (administrative  structures)  and informal  (patrimonial
relations)  institutions  affecting  project design and implementation.  In addition  to making
institutional  diagnoses,  the IEA was designed  as a participatory  assessment  of the core public
sector and was successfully  piloted during  the preparation  of a Sectoral  Adjustment  Loan  in the
Gambia. 25 Benefits  of this LEA  exercise  included  increased  flow of information  about formal  and
informal  institutions  to policymakers,  broad ownership  of proposed  changes  in the rules of the
game, and greater impetus  for a host of other institutional  initiatives. 26 This methodology  was
later applied to sector-specific  state institutions  in Zambia's education  sector. 27
2.21  Since  the publication  of WDRI  997,  the Bank  has more systematically  identified  those
aspects  of the state's internal  machinery  that help  restrain arbitrary  action in policymaking  and
budgeting. Without appropriate  internal  checks  and balances  on cabinet-level  actors,  collective
decisionmaking  in the executive  is not mutually  binding. There is also a greater  likelihood  that
SD sectors will suffer from arbitrariness,  uncertainty,  and inefficiency.  PREM  is in the process
of preparing  assessments  of accountability  mechanisms  on executive  decisionmaking  within  the
core public sector.2 S
Applying  the Framework
2.22  The framework  outlined  above  helps identify  combinations  of checks  and balances (or
institutional  arrangements)  that enhance  the efficiency  of the design,  delivery,  and regulation  of
services. It also identifies  the types of institutional  characteristics  of countries  that shape  policy
choices. There is growing  demand  for IA tools that would enable  the Bank to fit state-of-the-art
24 Berryman et al., 1997.
25 Pinto, 1994.
26 Ibid., p. 7.
27 Pinto,  1995.
28 Manning et al., 1998.12
advice to the particular  characteristics  of client  countries. The next section  uses this framework
to review  the Bank's support  for SD in the HNP sector.
3.  Bank Support for Service Delivery in HNP
3.1  This case study of HNP analyzes  the extent to which the Bank recommended  country-
specific,  "better  practice" institutional  options  for the delivery  of clinical  and public  health
services. Accordingly,  section  3 describes  the evolution  of the Bank's involvement  in HNP
(including  its assistance  strategy, use of instruments,  and outcomes). It then highlights  the
institutional  determinants  of portfolio  performance  and provides  recommendations  for improving
the goodness  of fit between  good  practice institutional  options for delivery  and country  context.
The evidence  presented  here is largely  drawn from OED's recent portfolio  review of HNP
lending  as well as companion  sector  impact  evaluations.
Strategy  & Implementation  Record  for Service  Delivery  Support,  1970-1997
3.2  Since 1970,  Bank support  for SDIs in HNP  has been defined  by three more or less
distinct generations. The first two generations  relied largely  on the public  monopoly  model for
service  provision  in population  and nutrition  (1970-1980)  and clinical  health (1981-1989)
respectively. From 1990,  a third generation  of SDI support  began  to emerge  even as increases  in
direct lending  to health made  HNP one of the fast growing  Bank portfolios. In this third
generation,  the Bank has attempted  to shift its focus from  geographically-specific  projects  to
sectoral  reforms, which solicit  alternative  providers  of health services  as key stakeholders. The
evolution  of these three generations  -- (i) public  monopoly  provision  of population  and nutrition
services,  (ii) increasing  the efficiency  of public sector  monopolies  in HNP,  and (iii) the search  for
diverse  and competitive  health providers  -- is presented  in Table 6.
Table  6. Characteristics  of Bank  Support  for Health,  Nutrition  and  Population,  1970-1997
Population  and Nutrition,  1970-1980  | Clinical  and  Public  Health: Searching  for
Direct  Lending  for Health,  1981-1989  Diverse  and Competitive  Providers,  1990-Present
*  Geographically-specific  project  objectives  *  Systemic  or policy  level  project objectives
*  Focus on physical  implementation  *  Expand  services  and invest in the long-run
*  Channel technical expertise to reduce  sustainability of the sector
constraints  *  Financial  reform  primarily  through  user fees
*  Public  monopoly  provision  with  investments  in  *  Introduction  of NGOs  as providers
public  sector  capacity  building
Source: Adapted  from Stout  and Johnston,  1998
Population dnd Nutrition: Public Monopoly Provision, 19 70-1980
3.3  Between 1970  and 1980,  the Bank's health-related  activities  were primarily  focused  on
population  and nutrition;  they  targeted  key development  constraints  associated  with rapid
population growth. With the publication of WDR 1984: Population and Development, the need
for population  policy was further  justified in terms of reducing  the gap between  the private and13
social  net benefits  of having  many  children. 29 At the same  time, the Bank failed to provide
economic  rationale  for the  public monopoly  delivery  arrangements  it recommended  for family
planning  and nutrition. It implicitly  assumed  that public sector  monopolies  would satisfy  the
"9unmet  [family  planning  and nutrition]  needs" of citizens. Accordingly,  concepts  such as
consumer  demand  and service  utilization  were largely absent  from supply-side  population  and
nutrition interventions.
3.4  Investment  lending,  comprising  Specific  Investment  Loans (SILs)  and Sector  Investment
and Maintenance  Loans (SIMs),  was  the instrument  of choice for Bank interventions  in this early
period. During the 1970-1980  period,  the Bank approved  22 population  projects,  two nutrition
projects, and three health sector  projects  with commitments  totaling  $510.9  million. According
to OED, only 58% of audited  projects in this young  portfolio  had satisfactory  outcomes. The
overwhelming  majority of projects  from this period  (77%)  were not rated for either institutional
development  (ID) impact  or sustainability. Of those that were rated, only one-third  achieved
substantial  ID impact  and two-thirds  were likely to be sustainable.
Chart 1. HNP  Projects  and  Commitments  by Lending  Instrument,  1970-1997
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Direct Lendingfor  Health: Enhancing Efficiency in the Public Sector, 1981-1989
3.5  In the decade following  the 1978  "Health  for All by the Year 2000" Conference  in Alma-
Ata, the Bank's program  of dramatically  increasing  direct  lending for health reflected  the global
consensus  on guaranteed  access  to basic  health services. As its commitments  to health rose
between 1981  and 1989,  the Bank integrated  its population,  health and nutrition  portfolios  and
began to more explicitly  consider  the role of the state in the delivery of HNP services.
Government  intervention  was now  justified on grounds  of equity and market failures  in the
provision  and financing  of health care. Allocative  issues of health expenditure  gained
29 Stout  et al., 1997.14
prominence  as policymakers  recognized  the demand  externalities  associated  with basic health
provision. This emphasis  on increasing  inputs to the health system served  to obscure  issues  of
technical efficiency. The assumption  that public monopolies  would efficiently  provide  health
sector  outputs  remained  largely unquestioned.
3.6  Between 1981  and 1989,  Bank commitments  to HNP grew  rapidly to over $3 billion.
Investment  lending  continued  to be the Bank's main instrument  even as health sector  projects
grew in size and complexity,  particularly  in regions  with weak institutions  such as AFR. 30
Cognizant  of the tendency  to design complex  projects  in weak institutional  settings,  the Bank
responded  with public sector  capacity  building  initiatives  on health sector  projects. According  to
OED,  over 83%  of all projects  in the portfolio  sought  to enhance  the capacity  of public sector
agencies. Capacity  building  concerns  included  improving  skills,  increasing  resources  of
agencies,  improving  information  systems  as well as budgeting  and planning. In addition  to
capacity  building,  the Bank aimed to utilize decentralization  as a mechanism  to make health
sector interventions  more efficient. While its economic  justification  was  not clearly  articulated,
decentralization  was recommended  as a SD component  in nearly  40% of projects in the entire
HNP portfolio.31
3.7  Despite  attempts  to improve  the organizational  quality  of public sector  health providers,
only 19%  were  judged to have substantial  ID impact. Furthermore,  only 60% of HNP projects
rated by OED  during the 1981-1989  period  had satisfactory  outcomes  and 43% were rated likely
to be sustainable. This suggests  that the public  monopoly  model for SD, even  when
supplemented  by capacity  building  components,  is not sufficient  for realizing  efficiency  and
effectiveness  on Bank projects.
Clinical and Public Health: Searching  for Diverse and Competitive Providers, 1990 - Present
3.8  In the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, the Bank began to articulate
a definitive  role for public  policy in the HNP sector. According  to the Bank,  the state should
ensure access  to essential  packages  of both public and clinical  health services,  while  encouraging
a competitive  and diverse  mosaic  of participants  in health sector  funding,  delivery,  and regulation
(see Box 2). The government's  role in guaranteeing  the essentials  of public and clinical  health
was  justified on grounds  of (i) alleviating  poverty,  (ii) providing  pure public goods  or goods  with
significant  demand  externalities,  and (iii) correcting  market failures in both health care and health
insurance.
3.9  For the delivery  of clinical services,  the 1993  WDR  recommended  three  mechanisms
other than  public monopolies  -- greater decentralization  of public healthcare  provision,  improved
hospital  management,  and stronger  regulation  of private  providers. First, decentralizing  the
planning  and management  of health services  to the provincial  or district  level was considered  a
means of increasing  responsiveness  to local needs and improving  technical  efficiency.
Nevertheless,  the Bank  noted pitfalls such as the lack of local capacity  or the inability  of clients
to hold local officials accountable.  In other  words, decentralization  of health planning  by itself
does  not provide sufficient  checks  and balances  on the delivery of public and clinical  health
services. Second,  managerial  reforms  in hospitals  such as autonomization,  corporatization,  and
outsourcing  were noted as avenues  for achieving  significant  efficiency  gains. Finally,  the Bank
30 Stout  and Johnston,  1998.
31 Ibid.15
recognized that encouraging competition between private providers in the health sector would
require increased regulatory capacity to monitor and enforce publicly and professionally-
mandated standards.
Box 2. Packages  of Essential  Public  and Clinical  Health  Services
Package  of Essential  Public  Health  Services
*  Expanded  program  on immunization  and micro-nutrient  supplementation
*  School  health  programs  to treat  worm  infections  and micronutrient  deficiencies
*  Programs  to increase  public  knowledge  about  family  planning  and  nutrition,  self-cure,
and vector  control/disease  surveillance  activities
*  AIDS  prevention  program  with strong  STD  component
Package  of Essential  Clinical  Health  Services
*  Prenatal  and delivery  services
*  Farnily  planning
*  Integrated  management  of the sick  child (including  diarrheal  diseases,  acute
respiratory  infections  (ARIs),  and  malaria)
*  Treatment  of tuberculosis
*  Case  management  of sexually-transmitted  diseases  (STDs)
Source: Investing in Health, WDR 1993
3.10  In the 1990s, concerns about technical efficiency have grown with increasing HNP
commitments.  In fact, between 1990 and 1997, the Bank approved 249 HNP operations with
total commitments of $13 billion.  While investment lending (e.g., SIMs, SILs) remained the
dominant instrument for Bank support, sectoral adjustment lending and social funds were
increasingly utilized for HNP interventions (see Chart 1). To some extent, the use of adjustment
lending was a function of the Bank's  shift from a project-based to a systemic focus, which
included "major organizational change" or "financial reform."  According to OED's recent
review of HNP lending, 52% of projects approved during FY1995-97 had a systemic focus as
opposed to only 33% for those approved during FY1985-89.
3.11  In some cases, sectoral reform proposals included recommendations for alternative
funding and delivery arrangements such as decentralization, user fees, and partnerships with
NGOs.  In particular, decentralization was a component of nearly 75% of post- 1990 operations.
However, it was not clear whether decentralization was actually designed to elicit either "voice"
or "choice" as a SD mechanism. When recommendations were made to establish voice and
private sector participation (PSP) mechanisms outside the public sector, they were mainly in the
post-1990 period.  Even in the 50% of post-1990 operations that did commit to use NGOs in
delivery, virtually none assessed the capacity and character of the NGO sector during project
preparation.  Intensive supervision or ex post evaluation will be required to determine whether
Bank projects actually employed NGOs either as competitive providers or conduits for consumer
voice.  Despite the 1993 WDR's  strategic framework for HNP delivery, post-1990 projects rarely
incorporated PSP or its variants (e.g., autonomization, corporatization) at the time of appraisal.
3.12  Of the 13 completed projects which OED has audited from the early 1990s, 69% received
satisfactory ratings for outcomes and 62% for sustainability.  Despite these improvements on
second generation performance, only 26% were judged to have substantial ID impact.  This
evidence corroborates the view that substantial progress in ID requires systematic unbundling of16
public sector  monopolies  through  the appropriate  use of voice or choice in delivery.  The failure
to realize changes  in the rules of the game explains  why  ID ratings  on average  have  not improved
significantly  on HNP projects since  the 1981-1989  period  (see Chart  2). As far as ongoing
projects are concerned,  29% of all HNP projects  currently  under supervision  are considered  "at
risk," which compares  favorably  to the Bank-wide  average  of 30%, but poorly  to other social
sector  averages. Management  problems  and inappropriate  location  of projects  are cited as prime
sources  of problems  for on-going  operations.
Chart  2. OED  Institutional  Development  Impact  Ratings  for  HNP
Projects  by  Approval  Years,  1970-1997
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Determinants  of Portfolio  Performance
3.13  A number  of factors  have limited  the effectiveness  of the Bank's HNP portfolio  during
the 1980s  and 1990s. Of these,  the quality  of Bank support  for SDIs clearly  has been a major
determinant  of outcome  performance. In fact, when  used as an evaluative  tool, the goods  and
country  characteristics  framework  (described  in section  2) actually  illustrates  how Bank strategy,
processes,  and instruments  could  have been shaped  quite differently  in order to enhance
relevance  and effectiveness.
The  Bank's Strategic  Framework
3.14  The 1993  WDR  made an important  contribution  to SD in HNP by clearly  defining
"essential  packages"  of clinical and public  health services  and justifying  the role of public policy
in guaranteeing  access  and efficient  delivery  of these services. At the same  time, the report
stopped  short of deriving  a menu of better  practice delivery  arrangements  from the goods
characteristics  of clinical  and public health services. This conceptual  gap explains  the Bank's
tendency  to rely heavily on public monopoly  approaches  to SD in most HNP interventions.  As a
result, the institutional  dimensions  of Bank support  for HNP generally  lagged  behind
advancements  in infrastructure  sectors,  where PSP became  a standard  plank of Bank strategy  by
the early 1990s.17
3.15  Ignored Goods  Characteristics.  Over  the past decade,  the public monopoly  approach  has
been  the subject  of growing  criticism. Since  the late 1980s,  internal  reviews  of HNP lending
have increasingly  cited a range  of problems  that are endemic  to monopolistic  SD systems. These
include  inadequate  focus on consumer  demand,  poor fit between  project design  and institutional
32 capacity,  and a failure to systematically  incorporate  PSP or voice in service  provision.  Aside
from some recent recommendations  to base the government's  role in delivery  and financing  on an
economic  classification  of health activities,  most HNP reviews  have not used the goods
characteristics approach as an evaluative tool. 33 For the purposes of this paper, Table 7
categorizes  various  health sector  services  according  to neo-institutional  criteria.
Table 7. Categorizing  Essential  Clinical  and  Public  Health  Services  by Goods  Characteristics
Variables  High Contestability  Low  Contestability
High  Type  I  Type  11
Measurability  *  Pharmaceuticals  *  Expensive  High  Technology  Services
*  Medical  Supplies
Low  Non-info  Info  Asymmetric  Non-info  Info  Asymmetric
Measurability  Asymmetric  Type  III-B  Asymmetric  Type IV-B
Type Ill-A  *  Most  Clinical  and  Type  IV-A
*  Management  Public  Health  Services  *  Epidemiological
Services  *  Family  planning  Surveillance
*  Support  *  Research
Services  *  Integrated  management
Services  ~of  Sick  Children
*  Immunization *  Programs  to reduce
*  Screening  of  consumption  of
donors  to  tobacco,  alcohol,  and
prevent  blood  other  drugs
boranemissio  *  Dissemination  of health
transmission  and scientific
information
Source: Author
3.16  As indicated  in Table 7, the Bank's HNP portfolio  in a given  country  is typically
comprised  of a complex  assortment  of goods  -- from  epidemiological  surveillance  (Type  IV-A)
to medical supplies  (Type I). This diverse  basket  of HNP goods  in tum requires  an equally
diverse  menu of delivery  arrangements.  Put simply,  the goods characteristics  approach  implies
that Bank projects  in HNP should  employ  various combinations  of voice, choice,  and hierarchy  at
different stages of the project cycle (see Table 8).  For instance, immunization is a low
measurability,  non-information  asymmetric,  high contestability  good that avails  itself to
professional  standardization  in design and monitoring,  as well as PSP in delivery. The
appropriate  delivery  option  would be to contract  with multiple  private,  public, and non-profit
providers in order to maximize  access  and efficiency. These  providers  would  then be audited by
central  disease  control  authorities  for inputs (e.g.,  the quality  of vaccines)  and outputs  (e.g.,
numbers vaccinated).
32 Stout, 1997.
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Table 8.  Corresponding Institutional Arrangements for Different HNP Services
Variables  High Contestability  Low Contestability
High  Type  I  Type  11
Measurability  . Competitive  bidding  for expensive,
Private  sector  participation  in  provision  of  high technology  services;  with  auditing
pharmaceuticals  supplies  of outputs
Low  Non-info  Asymmetric  Info  Asymmetric  Non-info  Info  Asymmetric
Measurability  Type  111-A  Type  III-B  Asymmetric  Type  IV-B
Type  IV-A
. Private  participation  . Beneficiary
in immunization  participation  in  . Hierarchical
and screening  family  planning  management  of
subject  to  . disease  control
professional  health  . Commumtybased  and surveillance
standards  pnmary  care  (with  functions  (at
both modem  and  local or national
. "One-stop  traditional  healers)  levels)
shopping"  for case  e  "One-stop
management  of  shop
STD  patients  integrated
. Fixed-term  management  of
contracting  for  the sick  child  with
management  and  parental  feedback
support  services;  Providing  public
reporting  of outputs  infti  on
and inputs  by public  HNP  with
and private  feedback  from
professionals  clients
Source: Author
3.17  Similarly, prenatal and delivery care is a low measurability, high contestability,
information asymmetric good.  It should be provided by community or private health workers
subject to professional and public standards. The information-asymmetric quality of prenatal and
delivery care implies clients have information regarding the performance of providers which
hierarchs in government do not.  Therefore, it requires voice mechanisms both in design and
monitoring to ensure responsiveness to client demand.  A clear message from this exercise is that
the Bank is rarely justified in not providing a menu of institutional options for delivery.
Alternatively, there are very few cases in which the Bank should rely exclusively on public
monopoly SD arrangements at all stages of the HNP project cycle.  Yet, several reviews and
audits of Bank involvement reveal that PSP and voice have not been systematically employed at
either the national or local levels. Only four completed HNP projects used voice mechanisms in
ways that afforded significant decision-making authority to beneficiaries.
3.18  While qualitative improvements in the use of voice and choice on HNP projects were
rare, the Bank frequently recommended "decentralization" as a way of enhancing the technical
efficiency of health services. It is worth noting that certain forms of decentralization do allow for
the credible use of voice (by devolving planning and management) and competition (through
inter-jurisdictional competition if people can "vote with their feet").  However, recommendations
for decentralization in HNP were generally not linked to goods characteristics of services. Nor19
were they systematically linked to the social and political realities of client countries. This
suggests that the Bank has taken a "hit or miss" approach to decentralization in HNP rather than a
selective, institutional one.
3.19  The Bank's role in Brazil's health system is a case in point.  An OED sectoral impact
study of HNP in Brazil found that the "Bank's  stance on health decentralization has never been
clear and comprehensive."  The failure to identify and incorporate factors in the country
institutional endowment into Bank strategy has led, at times, to contradictory policies with
respect to decentralization.  By way of example, the report added:
"The Sao  Paulo project  sought  to support  the health  decentralization  underway  in the middle 1980s,
but the complexity  of politics in that  state, as well as the Bank's failure  to appreciate  it in full,
resulted  in a project  that  was not well articulated  with the evolving  governance  of the state...The
recent  health sector  reform,  Reforsus,  supports  decentralization  by encouraging  managerial
development,  but its emphasis  on setting  national  cost-effectiveness  priorities  places  its strategy  in
conflict  with  the objective  of local autonomy  and regional  diversity  in SUS (Single  Health  System)
prices." 34
3.20  These findings illustrate the dangers of making formulaic recommendations for
decentralization without considering the challenges posed by a country's  institutional
endowment.  It also shows how Bank support for decentralization could very easily resemble
supply-driven assistance to centralized public monopolies.  By focusing on building managerial
capacity in local governments, rather than changing the underlying rules for delivering outputs,
the Bank may inadvertently encourage municipal and provincial administrators to reproduce
monopolistic arrangements and generate significant deadweight loss in local healthcare markets.
3.21  Not Fitted to Country Characteristics. According to OED, institutional analysis
(including analysis of borrower ownership and client demand) had stronger influence on HNP
outcomes than economic analysis. Yet, the Bank's overall failure to assess and incorporate
institutional factors into its projects and sector strategies constitutes a major oversight.  As is
described below, assessments of state, political, and social institutions rarely informed either
Bank strategy or project design. 35
*  State Institutions:  At appraisal, virtually all HNP projects cited poor borrower capacity in
implementing agencies as a project risk.  Yet, OED reports that 69% of the Implementation
Completion Reports (ICRs) for unsatisfactory projects argued that capacity should have been
more thoroughly assessed.  Furthermore, as the distinction between capacity and institutions
remained vague, capacity assessments focused largely on training of personnel rather than on
incentives.  In fact, only 17% of projects analyzed the incentive structures of government
officials and service providers and only 30% discussed incentives at all (including incentives
of service providers).  In addition, few projects analyzed the regulatory and legal
environment governing health service provision.  It is also worth noting that in spite of the
Bank's willingness to recommend decentralization, less than half of the projects
recommending decentralization actually assessed the intra-public sector legal environment
affecting intergovernmental relations.
34 Gauri, 1998.
35 Stout and Johnston, 1998.20
*  Political  Institutions: OED's review  noted  that 30% of appraisal  documents  for HNP  projects
cited some form of political  resistance  from bureaucrats,  providers,  etc. However,  only 5%
(all approved  since  FYI 990) of these  appraisals  included  some form of interest group
analysis. In addition,  poor ownership  by borrowers  was noted in nearly  40% of all completed
projects  and 55% of ICRs  for unsatisfactory  projects. This is in part the result of the
vagueness  of prevailing  definitions  of ownership  in general.  Ownership  is often defined  in
terms of verbal expressions of support for project objectives rather than institutional or
structural  factors  that shape the incentives  for key political actors  to reform.
*  Social  Institutions:  While  NGO participation  in implementation  was as an explicit  project
goal in the post-1990  phase of lending,  few projects  analyzed  the capacity  of the NGO sector.
Analysis  of traditional  institutions,  particularly  as they relate  to women's active  participation
in the HNP sector,  was also absent  from Bank project  documents  as well. Finally,  the size
and character  of the private healthcare  providers,  which  requires  regular  monitoring  and
assessment,  were rarely reported  at appraisal.
3.22  The introduction  of new players and delivery  options  necessarily  opens Bank  projects to
a vast array of institutional  factors  that influence  project design and implementation.  In countries
with more developed  PSP and voice arrangements,  demand  for routine IAs is likely to increase
for both lending and non-lending  services.
Re-thinking  the Project Cycle
3.23  As described  above,  Bank support  for SD in the HNP sector  has guided  by a largely
technocratic  approach,  paying scarce  attention  on the incentive  framework  for delivery  or new
providers. By contrast,  the institutional  approach  would  have required  the Bank to engage  a
broader  range  of interlocutors  in the design,  delivery,  and monitoring  phases  of the project cycle.
For instance,  Table 9 shows  how Type III-B  goods  such as family planning  would undergo
participatory  design  processes  as both beneficiaries  and professional  technocrats  collaborate  in
better defining  content and performance  standards  for that particular  HNP service. Typically,
social assessments  (SAs) would  help identify  factors  such as custom,  politics, and patronage
networks  that influence  consumer  behavior. Then,  borrowing  governments  could  rely on private
providers  of contraceptives,  health information,  and personalized  counseling  to compete  in the
delivery  of family planning  services. When  appropriate,  the Bank could solicit  traditional
healers' assistance  in strengthening  communities'  willingness  to use and demand  modem family
planning  services, Subsequently,  the monitoring  of SD could  be conducted  jointly by
professional  health sector  technocrats  (using  traditional  analytical  techniques)  and consumers
(through  surveys  and participatory  mechanisms  in which  experts  take a facilitating  role vis-a-vis
beneficiaries). 36
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Table 9.  Mapping Institutional Options for Design, Delivery, and Monitoring of HNP Services
Stage  of Intervention  Market  Participation  Hierarchy
Design  IIIB.  IIIB
Delivery  IIIB  <....  . .
Monitoring  &  IIIB  *  .....  ...  IIIB
Enforcement
Source: Author
3.24  In reality, even  those HNP projects  that aspire  to an institutional  approach  generally  lack
adequate  processes  and instruments  to incorporate  new players  and new institutional
arrangements.  Without  new Bank processes  and instruments,  it is unrealistic  to expect significant
substantive  improvements  in support  for HNP. Overly ambitious  HNP  projects in poor
institutional  environments  can easily  generate  a downward  spiral of poor outcomes. In fact,
OED's review  found that the  HNP portfolio  was caught  in a vicious cycle of designing  overly
complex  projects in countries  to compensate  for low institutional  quality and poor existing  health
conditions  (e.g., low rate of decline  of infant mortality). Breaking  this vicious  cycle is ultimately
a matter of (i) injecting a greater degree  of realism  into project  preparation  and (ii) using
instruments  and processes  that are appropriate  for systemic  objectives.
3.25  First, the argument  for realistic  expectations  is in fact an argument  for institutional
assessment. Without  basic informnation  about consumer  preferences  or NGO sector  capacity,  the
Bank will not be able to define or implement  sectoral  strategies. Nor will it be able to fit "better
practice" delivery  options for goods  to specific  country  needs. In fact, OED  found a "disturbing
lack of attention  to consumer  demand"  as well as a failure to monitor service  utilization  rates on
HNP interventions.  As can  be expected,  69%  HNP projects  through  FY1986  did not have client-
responsive  services, 37 SAs as well as other IA tools would  help remedy  these problems  during
project identification  and preparation  (see Box 3).
37 Stout and Johnston, 1998.22
Box 3. Understanding  Client  Behavior:  Social  Assessment  in the India  Tuberculosis  Control  Project
Background.  India  faces  a tuberculosis  crisis  with  more  than 1.2  million  cases  reported  every year and an
annual  mortality  rate of nearly  500,000.  The Government  of India  (GOI),  with  the help of the Bank and
WHO,  revised  its TB control  program  to encourage  directly  observed  treatment,  i.e., when  patients  take
prescribed  drugs in the presence  of health  workers  or trained  personnel. It also  focused  on infectious
patients  to curb transrnission.
The Social  Assessments  (SAs). A major  obstacle  in the battle against  TB is the failure  of patients  to
complete  their treatment. Project  planners  knew  that overcomning  this obstacle  required  knowledge  of
factors  influencing  both the behavior  of TB patients  and their  relationship  to service  providers.
Accordingly,  SAs of urban slum dwellers  and tribals  were designed  as part of the project's  Infornation,
Education,  and Communication  (IEC) component.  The SAs aimed  to (i) collect  and analyze  socio-
economic  data, (ii) solicit  the participation  of urban  and tribal stakeholders  in planning,  and (iii) develop
social  indicators  related  to project  performance.
Findings. Four  key SA findings  contributed  to the (re)design  of the TB control  project.
*  Poverty  -- Most  patients  did not complete  treatment  because  they  were poor. They  were unable to pay
for transportation,  medicine,  treatment  by private  practitioners.  The poor also could  not sustain  the
income  foregone  while collecting  their medicine. Finally,  the rural  poor did not have access  to
primary  health centers. These  problems  were exacerbated  in the case  of women,  whose  activities  were
limited  in comparison  to those of men.
*  Service Providers -- Government, NGO, and private practitioners provided TB services.  Of these,
patients  first sought  out private  practitioners  because  they felt  that the latter would  treat  them with
greater  respect  than other  providers. They  also  valued  the greater  privacy  afforded  by private
practitioners.  Finally,  patients  perceived  free government  medicine  to be of poorer  quality. Since
NGOs  were not major  providers  of TB treatment  and  private  practitioners  did not provide  adequate
follow-up,  most patients  ended  up with government  providers  when  the disease  was advanced. These
government  providers,  who administered  directly  observed  therapy,  serviced  the largest  number  of
compliant  patients.
*  Stigma and Secrecy - The stigma associated with TB was a major disincentive to patients seeking or
completing  treatment. This stigma  was higher among  urban slum dwellers  and was inversely
correlated  with  their level of education.  In some areas,  TB stigma  was so strong  that  even  health
workers  kept diagnoses  secret.
*  Communication  -- Word of mouth  communication  through  compliant  and cured patients  was the most
effective  means of spreading  information  about the disease. Yet  most physicians  posted  in tribal areas
did not speak  the local language  or understand  tribal  culture. Furthermore,  many  patients  also felt the
government-sponsored  providers  are routinely  blamed  them for noncompliance.
Impact  of the SA on the Project.  SA findings  enabled  the project  team to develop  a more focused  IEC
strategy,  a new approach  to involving  private  physicians,  and better  ways of measuring  project  outcomes.
Source:  Environment  Department,  Social  Assessment  Series,  1997
The Needfor  Appropriate Instruments and Processes
3.26  The ancillary issue of instruments and processes is central to the Bank's ability to
leverage changes in the incentive framework for SD at the sectoral level. Despite a growing
trend towards using sectoral adjustment lending on HNP projects, the Bank's  HNP portfolio is
still largely comprised of investment lending (i.e., SILs, SIMs, and TALs).  However, the supply-
driven, geographically-specific character of investment loans may reinforce the public monopoly23
model with the government  agency  as the Bank's sole interlocutor. The  portfolio  would  benefit
from adjustment  lending,  which affords  greater  leverage  in achieving  reforms at the sectoral  or
systemic  level. For more localized  interventions,  social  funds allow  for greater  experimentation
with alternative  governance  structures  in which  government  is no longer  the sole purveyor  of SD
systems. Furthermore,  these funds  support  demand-driven  pilots  that produce  demonstration
effects, encourage  learning,  and behavioral  change  in the HNP sector.
3.27  Successful  transition  in HNP  requires  that traditionally  technocratic  processes  in project
management,  supervision,  evaluation  give  way to more decentralized  ones. Project  management
and supervision  were primarily  designed  to help a single  public sector  agency  meet the short-run
physical  implementation  objectives  of investmnent  operations. Fifteen  percent of the ICRs  noted
that project  management  units (PMIUs)  undermined  project ownership  as their enclave  function
prevented  integration  in the mainstream  of the ministry  in question. 38 In general,  PMUs were
narrowly focused  on "protecting"  projects from  poor ownership  (i.e.,  political  resistance)  rather
than building  broad coalitions  (e.g., among  technocrats,  legislators,  beneficiaries,  and providers)
to meet the Bank's broader  HNP objectives. Inadequate  supervision  was also cited as a problem
in over 70% of ICRs for unsatisfactory  projects. Moreover,  the quality  of supervision  was a
pressing  concern  particularly  in monitoring  institutional  change  on nearly one third of completed
projects. In the future,  the Bank and borrowers  will have  to develop  new indicators  for
monitoring  institutional  change,  sectoral  performance  and political readiness  while increasing
supervision  effort. In this regard,  the Bank's decision  to decentralize  HNP supervision  to the
national  level demonstrates  foresight.
3.28  As with other  areas of Bank involvement,  monitoring  and evaluation  (M&E)  of HNP
projects suffered. Data on the performance  of projects  was rarely collected  or analyzed. Few
ICRs provided  data that systematically  linked  national  data on health status to project inputs and
outputs. OED's review  of HNP lending  also found  that performance  measurement  of HNP
projects was significantly  better on single-purpose  population  projects  rather than general  health
sector  reform  projects. 39 In so far as evaluation  is itself a key development  institution,  the Bank
should  think broadly  about  using voice,  exit, and hierarchical  options  to monitor  performance.
Since  service statistic  systems  (in the public sector)  tend to be "highly  burdensome  at the point of
service  delivery,"  alternative  evaluation  institutions  should  be actively  employed  on Bank
projects  -- e.g., participatory  evaluation  for community  obstetrics  (Type  III-B goods)  or private
sector auditing  of hospital  management  (Type  III-A goods).
Summary  and Recommendations
3.29  Bank support  for SDIs in the HNP sector  has been largely  technocratic,  relying on one
delivery model -- the public sector monopoly -- for a great variety of clinical and health services.
The public monopoly  approach  generally  ignored  the influence  of institutions  as well as the
political realities  of the health sector  reform. As a result,  outcomes  performance,  ID impact,  and
sustainability  of the HNP  portfolio  have suffered.
3.30  OED's review of HNP lending  verified a number  of key hypotheses  set forth  by the
framework  presented  in section  2. Accordingly,  substantive  and process lessons  identified  in the
case study may have  remained  obscure  without  an institutional  approach.
38 Ibid.
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Bank strategy  in HNP should be guided  by thefollowing  substantive  recommendations:
*  Systematically  categorize  essential  health  and clinical services  according  to goods
characteristics  with appropriate  menus of SD arrangements.  Use this goods characteristics
scheme  as a benchmark  for country  and sector  strategies.
*  Conduct  ex ante institutional  assessments  (including  SAs and political readiness  analyses)  of
the private sector,  the state,  and the informal  sector  during  project identification  and upstream
of HNP sector  strategies.
*  Require  lending and non-lending  services  to provide  clear economic  (i.e., goods
characteristic)  rationale  for the use of either  public monopolies  or recommendations  for
decentralization.
Corresponding  changes  in Bank  processes  and instruments  should  be considered  as well:
*  Rely more on adjustment  lending  to leverage  changes  in the incentive  framework  for delivery
at the sectoral  level.
*  Use social funds for localized  interventions  in order  to demonstrate  demand-driven  delivery
while  encouraging  learning  and behavioral  change  on a micro-level.
*  Routinize  lAs of state, political,  and social  institutions  in identification  and preparation.
*  Utilize alternative  project management  strategies  to build stakeholder  support  for project and
sectoral objectives  rather  than narrowly  achieving  physical  implementation  targets  of
projects.
*  Decentralize  supervision  functions  to engage  a larger number  of interlocutors  in both
monitoring  and ex post evaluation  functions.25
4.  Evolution in Service Delivery: Challenges and Next Steps
4.1  Lessons  from the preceding  case study of HNP resonate  across  sectors including
infrastructure,  social and rural services. In each of these sectors,  the Bank faces  the challenge  of
fitting menus  of "better practice"  delivery  options  to maps of institutional  realities. As illustrated
in the HNP case, this requires  the Bank  to (i) unbundle  and categorize  the bundle  of project goods
and (ii) integrate  country  knowledge  into the implementation  of SD arrangements.
Evolving Towards A Goods Characteristics Approach
4.2  Even a cursory  glance  across sectors  reveals  that the Bank has made important  strides
towards  a goods  characteristics  approach,  particularly  in infrastructure. 40 Yet it has lagged
behind  in the social sectors,  where SD support  remains  largely  technocratic. Cross-sectoral
comparisons  reveal that Bank support  for SD has evolved  into four generations. First
generation  support,  particularly  in infrastructure  and rural services,  was primarily  focused  on
physical  implementation  of projects. The state's monopolistic  role in implementation  was  largely
assumed  in sectors such as irrigation  (1948-1971),  telecommunications  (pre-  I 970s),  and highway
construction  (1  970s). Heavy reliance  on investment  lending  reinforced  this bias as the public
sector  was the Bank's sole interlocutor. 4'  OED  ratings  of outcomes  were generally  satisfactory
because  projects met short run physical  implementation  targets.  In hindsight,  however,  these
"successes"  often obscured  low sustainability,  ineffective  targeting  of poor beneficiaries,  etc. 42
4.3  While they did not question  the public monopoly  for service  provision,  second
generation  interventions  were increasingly  concerned  with the financial  and organizational
viability  of implementing  agencies. Cost recovery  and O&M  management  became  a key ID
objective  in irrigation  (1972-1981),  telecommunications  (1970-1980),  and urban transport  (mid-
1970s-1980s). 43 Supply-driven  technical  assistance  was  used to "substitute  for local deficiencies
on a temporary basis -- e.g. for project preparation - or to introduce into a functioning
organization  or system an incremental  improvement  by means  of short-term  advisory  services  or
narrowly  focused  training."44  Substitution  TA may  have helped achieve  physical  implementation
targets,  but it did not address  the underlying  institutional  constraints  on sectoral  performance.
Demand  for services  tended to outstrip  supply  as public  monopolies  proved inadequate  in areas
such as telecommunications,  energy,  and HNP. In addition,  the low ID impact  of projects
indicated  that the Bank required  a systemic  or sectoral  focus in order to change  the underlying
incentive  framework  for SD. 45
4.4  The third generation  of SD support,  particularly  in infrastructure  (late 1980s-early
1990s),  proved to be a watershed  for the Bank and its clients. Advancements  in technology  and
global  transportation  enabled  greater  unbundling  of SD activities  that were previously
40 Section  4 drew from  OED  sector  studies,  audit  reports,  and Bank-wide  reviews  of infrastructure,  rural, and social
services. Annex  I summarizes  the evolution  of Bank  support  for SD across  sectors.
41 Barbu,  1994.
42 Stout, 1998.
43 Jones,  1992.
44 Steedman,  1995.
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aggregated. This unbundling  of project goods  was a major step towards  the goods  characteristics
approach  described  in section  2. For the first time, goods  characteristics  were linked to delivery
arrangements  in irrigation  (1982-1994),  telecommunications  (late 1980s-present),  railways
(1980s),  airports  (1990s)  and transport  overall  (1990s). As a result, the one-size-fits-all  public
monopoly  model gave way to a range of options  such as leases, concessions,  contracting  for the
market, outsourcing,  BOT and turnover  schemes,  etc.
4.5  As it recommended  the  break-up  of public  monopolies,  the Bank shifted  its focus from
individual  projects to sectoral,  policy-based  reforms. Adjustment  proved more effective  than
investment  lending in leveraging  policy reforms  that encouraged  PSP and citizen  participation  in
meeting  sectoral  demand. For instance,  SECALs,  SALs,  and multisector  adjustment  lending
played a prominent  role in unbundling  telecommunications  services  and de-monopolizing  public
utilities in the sector. 46
4.6  In some sense the prevalence  of high-measurability  project goods  in infrastructure
allowed  the Bank to move  relatively  quickly  towards  a goods  characteristics  approach. By the
same  token,  the low measurability  of many social  goods  arguably  contributed  to the Bank's
reluctance  to abandon  the  public monopoly  model  in these sectors. The full potential  of the
goods  characteristics  approach  may be realized  in fourth  generation  interventions  that develop
new governance  arrangements,  which combine  competition,  voice, and hierarchy  in the design,
delivery,  and monitoring  stages  of projects. Some  illustrative  operations  are the Andhra  Pradesh
Forestry,  Uzbekistan  Water Supply  and Sanitation,  and Albania  Rural  Poverty  Alleviation.
Poor Country Knowledge
4.7  Overall,  the Bank has a poor track  record in building  country  knowledge  of institutional
endowments  that affect SD. Specifically,  SD support  across sectors  has rarely incorporated
assessments  and models of state,  political,  and social  institutions  into  project design. One
difficulty  in assessing  the Bank's work  in building  country  knowledge  is the absence  of
institutional  analysis  in evaluations  themselves. Most  evaluations  have only recently  begun
analyzing  goodness  of fit between  better practice  and institutional  context. 4 '
4.8  At any rate, the Bank's approach  to decentralization  in HNP is illustrative  of the dangers
of overlooking  country  institutional  factors  in sector strategies. Without  country  knowledge,
decentralization  has the potential  of becoming  a blueprint  solution  to problems  that were
themselves  created  by the one-size-fits-all  public monopoly  model. Even  when it is appropriate
for a particular  HNP good, public provision at the local level should  be assessed  in the context of
institutional  constraints  on the ground  (e.g., social  relationships  between  local elites and the poor,
central-local  relations, or bureaucratic  quality). Ultimately,  the Bank and its clients  require more
than sound  frameworks  and workable  IA tools. Country  teams and sector  units will need
unambiguous  incentives  to meet established  standards  for good  fit on SD operations.
Barbu, 1994.
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Challenges  and Next Steps
4.9  The remaining  challenges  for the Bank are therefore  both conceptual  as well as
operational. The concepts  and tools identified  in this paper  are only as valuable  as sector
specialists'  ability to operationalize  them in the project  cycle. In this regard, the following  next
steps are proposed  to mainstream  the institutional  approach  to SD reform.
*  Pilot the SD framework  for assessments  upstream  of Country  Assistance  Strategies
(CASs) and sector  strategies  in select sample  countries. Use the findings  and
recommendations  from the pilots  as benchmarks  for CASs  or for concurrent  CASs in
countries  with similar  institutional  constraints.
*  Disseminate  results of the pilots to sector specialists  through  the networks  in order to
further  develop  and refine the tools.
*  Develop  menus of workable  institutional  options  for the delivery  of specific services
(e.g., clinical health or basic education)  in each sector.
*  Develop  benchmarks  for SD support  based on these  menus of institutional  options
and "goodness  of fit" to country  context. Use these  benchmarks  to evaluate  and compare
the quality of Bank SD support  across client  countries.
$  Systematically  incorporate  the institutional  framework  presented  in this paper into
evaluation  methodologies  for Country  Assistance  Reviews/Notes  and audits. This will
provide  a visible incentive  for sector  specialists  to adopt both goods  characteristics  and
country  characteristics  approaches.28
Annex I. Four Generations of Bank Support for Service Delivery Across Select Sectors
Generations  1. The Assumption of  2. Making Public Monopolies  3. Breaking Government's Monopoly  4. Beyond Public Maladies & Private
Public Monopoly  More Efficient  Panaceas
State As Purveyor  An Efficient  Public  Monopoly  Introducing  New  Arrangements  Improving  Enforcement  of New  Rules
Providing  Good
Practice  Advice  *  Design,  Delivery,  and  *  Design,  Delivery,  and M&E  *  Which  players  are effective?  *  Which  rules of the game  are effective? based  on Goods  M&E  *  Inefficiencies  identified  *  PSP  alone confuses  organizations  and  *  Public  not by proprietorship  but by commitment
Characteristics  *  Lack  of sustainability  institutions,  content for form.  to publicly mandated  standards
*  Input-driven  TA  *  Private/participatory  involvement  in  *  Diversity  of P-A arrangements  that require
*  Pessimistic  of the ability  of private  or  funding,  design,  delivery,  and M&E  classification  and  nuanced  evaluation
beneficiary  to efficiency  manage  *  Funding  is open to user fees,  government  *  The importance  of M&E  as a technical  good
hardware  funding  when their are demand  practice  for software  and  hardware
extemalities  or min  consumption  standards  *  Hardware  and software  affect each other
*  Autonomy  as best incentive  for  fundamentally  and should  be integrated  in
management  operations
*  Contracting  arrangements  *  Regulation  has  to be subject  to checks  and
*  Emphasis  on private-public  mix rather  than  balances  as well. Incentives  for regulators.
incentives  in both sectors  Organizational  independence  is not good
*  Regulation:  independent,  hierarchical,  but  enough -- still need to deal with issues  of voice
with  discretion  and discretion
*  Participation  noted as important  *  Central  strategic  planning  capacity  for service
*  Shift from  agency to sectoral  focus  delivery  (a service  delivery  brain trust)  as a
counterpart  for the Bank
*  Sectoral  and Country  Focus
Lending  *  Investment  Lending  *  Investment  Lending  with  Technical  *  Adjustment  Lending  with  Technical  *  Adjustment  Lending
Instruments  Assistance  Assistance  *  Social Funds
Examples  of Bank  *  Irrigation  (1948-71)  *  Irrigation  (1972-81)  *  Irrigation  (1982-94)  lect on-going  operations  in:
Involvement  by  *  Telecom  (Pre-1970s)  *  Telecom  (1970-80)  *  Telecom  (late 1980s-  Present)
Sector  and  Time  *  Highways  (Until late  *  HNP  (1981^94)  *  HNP  (1994-Present)  P  Water  Supply & Sa)tation (Uzbekistan,
Period  1970s)  *  Highways  (late 1970s)  *  Railways  (1980s)  PFrestry)
*  Urban  Transport  (mid-1970s-80s)  *  Transport  overall  (1990s)  Forestry  (Indlia)
*  Airports  (1990s)
Source: Author29
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